Everyone who is at least slightly read up on the Three Kingdoms Era more than likely is familiar with the tale of Dèng Ài. An orphan turned worker under Cáo Cāo 曹操, picked from obscurity by the true genius and eye of actual talent Sīmǎ Yì 司馬懿, as all Cáo are inherently dumb and unable to make use of talent1. His irrigation works and defensive forts were beyond useful! Western and Eastern forces were smashed and, as per Rafe de Crespigny2, he alone conquered the “state” of Shǔ 蜀! Then two villains of horrible character, two selfish and untalented cretins brought him to his knees through unjust lies and slander, leading to his arrest which he oh so nobly accepted, only for a third snake, the worst of them all, to cut him down in the prime of his life! Alas, such a sad fate. The most loyal scion of the state cut down in such a way!
Enough of the sarcasm, it is time to cut this ridiculous viewpoint apart as it has deserved for a long time. How did Dèng Ài end up on the bad side of Sīmǎ Zhāo 司馬昭 to the point that the call was made for his arrest? Well that is extremely simple. Using the very convenient excuse that traitors often make, ‘the general in the field is not subject to the orders of the King’. Dèng Ài attempted to use this ancient “get out of jail free card” to appoint hundreds of people to offices that he did not have the authority to. More-over he not only stated that Hàn’s 漢 latter ruler be elevated to Prince status, and therefor rivaling Sīmǎ Zhāo, but he also proposed that “in order to entice surrender from the sovereign of Wú 吳” said newly crowned Prince should remain in the now conquered capital of his former state. Not only this but he also proposed leaving 40,000 soldiers and stockpiling resources for a future offensive effort.
Now I don’t know about you, but if I threw myself into the shoes of a sovereign and one of my most arrogant subordinates in my familial regime full of rebellions said this to me, I may grow a bit suspicion of him. Given that not long after said conquest of this ‘rebel state’ there was a revolt, one half attempting to put the surrendered Emperor back onto his throne and revive Hàn 漢, I’m going to say this plan was a tiny bit stupid. Or perhaps a plan to build up local sympathy from the people whom he already was attempting to treat remarkably well to create his own power-base.
“Thanks to having met me, you gentlemen are what you are today. Had you met men like Wú Hàn, you all could have been exterminated.”3
The charges against Dèng Ài in this post all come from his own words. His own actions. His own desires. The man praises his own deeds while showering the conquered with gifts, stating he isn’t some butcher coming to kill all of them. This isn’t a repeat of the fall of Gōngsūn Shù4 公孫述. Not at all, the people are treated wonderfully and the corrupt eunuch who cursed the state and caused it’s ruin shall be executed!5 Besides the heroes of Hàn 漢 like Jiāng Wéi were gifted beyond measure, and truly would’ve defeated any invader! Except Dèng Ài.6 How unfortunate for their armies, yet the state is safe!
How then, Dàolùn, could Dèng Ài be a traitor if he did not resist arrest? Well that’s easy, Wèi Guàn 衛瓘 enticed his soldiers to stand down and arrested him at night when he could not reasonably put up a fight. Ài went about citing the very not innocent Bái Qǐ7 白起 who very much resigned to his own guilty fate8 after much complaining, and yet… this arrest wasn’t simply the work of two men. There was a very public sentiment brewing that Dèng Ài was over-asserting his authority. Wèi Guàn was sent with orders from the King himself to tell Ài to cease his ways, and even greater than that you had a petition signed by the most major names sent to the King accusing him of treason. What ill-will would the likes of Hú Liè 胡烈 have against Ài? Nothing at all suggests that Zhōng Huì 鍾會 spread these “forged” letters of his around to enhance his plannings, they were correspondence between subject and lord. Dèng Ài, good will or not, was asserting authority he did not claim, enacting plannings without the input of the court and far more importantly without the paramount authority in Wei’s. By doing so he is setting himself as an equal to Sīmǎ Zhāo.
Many critics of Zhōng Huì’s rebellion in March of 264 will often state that it was foolish, the armies were tired and did not want to march upon there home. How then does one not apply this to Dèng Ài? Think how many of these men participated in the various uprisings to crush the likes of King of Yàn 燕王, Wén Qīn 文欽 and Guànqiū Jiǎn 毌丘儉, as well as Zhūgé Dàn 諸葛誕? There is a haughty, self obsessed General who leads a large army in the undamaged capital of a foreign adversary that proved hard to conquer, asserting his authority and warming himself up to the locals, yet you are surprised when these veterans of constant civil war should “turn against him”?
Even should you assert that Dèng Ài only had noble intentions of making use of this area, of planning a clever plot to entice surrenders as well as concoct a plan for invasion of their final rival state; how can you not see how his actions and words gives those both near and far the impression that he is going to revolt? Wáng Líng 王淩 did not declare his intentions for all, he masked them in an attack on the south. Isn’t this similar to Ài? Particularly in the eyes of someone, The King, who participated in the brief subjugation of Líng.
The call was made and Ài was arrested. Another revolt occurred in the former capital under Zhōng Huì, and now Ài’s former subordinates took this chance to break him out of captivity. Imperial Captivity. Something the King, through an Imperial Edict, ordered. Ài and his men are now overruling the King and Emperor. What comes next is not something I condone as honor killings being seen as good lead to horrible events, such as vengeance on a man by slaughtering his wife and baby as he was currently in the bathroom and unable to be killed presently9. Previously upon the taking Jiāngyóu 江油, Dèng Ài had promised to put his subordinate Tián Xù 田續 to death for perceived cowardice and impeding the campaign. However upon the capture of the capital, this plan was tossed aside yet Xù, rightfully held a grudge against a man who promised to take his life. Things, however, take a dark turn as news of Ài’s escape reached Wèi Guàn and he took advantage of Tián Xù’s bitterness, and therefor sent him with soldiers to track down and kill Ài, as well as everyone with him.10
In one sense Wèi Guàn acted properly, putting down this suspected rebel who had broken free of captivity ordered by the throne. This was not a bad act, even if one argues it was totally out of self-preservation. Self-preservation and good are not mutually exclusive. However doing so through the use of an honor killing with Tián Xù is terrible, and such a thing would bite Guàn on the ass at the end of his life. Yet Guàn always from his dealings in the Zhèngshǐ 正始 to remain out of factions to aide the state and his life, to his attempts to push the King of Rǔnán 汝南王 in the proper direction when dealing with issues in the 280s, did what he thought was right for the state. Regardless of how it had to be done, he put forth the effort as he had done here through terrible means. Though this is something to be discussed in a future article.
Sīmǎ Zhāo was quick to act in his final year, taking vengeance on Dèng Ài’s family. Nearly all were exterminated with the rest being sent westward into exile. Still after his death there was a fear lingering on the surviving subordinates of this accused traitor, and the King needed to know if there was trouble brewing. Táng Bīn 唐彬11 was sent westward to gauge the feelings of these former men of Ài’s and when he returned he told the King that Dèng Ài deceived the stupid and was envious to his core. Everyone who followed him saw this, and any who criticized him were said to be contrarian individuals who did not understand, facing grave accusations and insults. The west suffered greatly from his abuse and his overworking, and upon the news of his death they all rejoiced. There is no worry about these people he ruled and so the King was calmed.
There are those who suggest Bīn’s words are merely those that the King wanted to hear, and not the truth. After all Dèng Ài’s name was cleared! But… was it? Not exactly. Emperor Sīmǎ Yán 司馬炎 later did allow his family to be returned from exiled and, stating that Dèng Ài had been rightfully punished for his arrogance and usurping authority. A bit which is often overlooked by the next part when the Emperor says that he had redeemed himself through his willingness to submit to arrest.12 You as well have Duàn Zhuó 段灼 pleading the case of Dèng Ài that brought on this pardon for his family, cleverly remarking that a man in his 70s could never revolt!13 How old was Sīmǎ Yì 司馬懿 in 249 again..?
Could Bīn’s words be exactly what the King wanted to hear? Sure. But Zhuó’s were even more, subtly stating that the controversial foundation of Sīmǎ control did not begin with a rebellion, but a rightful cause. A political message through and through. This “posthumous rehabilitation” was a political ploy for the ruling family, not some clearing of Dèng Ài’s name.
Does any of this take away from Dèng Ài’s military ability in the end? That depends on how much a loss to a Zhūgě Zhān 諸葛瞻 means to you. But military records are quite boring and not my fixation, I’m not here to suggest he was better or worse than everyone constantly debates upon. Such a conversation does literally nothing for me. What I am interested in is dissecting the political ramifications of acts and words, how to survive and how to die. Too many simply toss out the notion that someone wasn’t a rebel because they didn’t yell for the world to here “I am in revolt!”. This man did everything but proclaim literally that he is intending to rebel, intentionally or not. And if you state it was unintentional then you have a worse opinion of this man than I do, which is impressive. When studying this or any other time period it is important to look beyond just the select biography. You must take in the entire political landscape so you may truly understand why actions were taken out. Otherwise you end up with black and white, and history is not that. To quote Kǒngzǐ 孔子:" Study without thought is useless; thought without study is dangerous.
In the end Dèng Ài met the fate he brought upon himself, dying as a traitor. Executed, his head hung in the capital on display for all to see and his sons executed.14 Do not challenge your boss.
Dèng Ài’s military career actually began in the Zhèngshǐ 正始 era under Cáo Shuǎng 曹爽, who appointed him to serve in military office in the western theater under Xiàhóu Xuán 夏侯玄, despite the insistence of some “people” that his epic career was truly all thanks to the wolf. Don’t let the Sīmǎ fans hear about that, it’ll fly in the face of their faulty narrative. It is just our secret.
As Rafe de Crespigny points out in the Wèi 魏 “article” of the Six Dynasties for Cambridge History Journal, it was only Dèng Ài who took down this bandit state in a corner. No one else aided in such a triumphant feat! To invoke a 21st century version of Wáng Bì’s 王弼 criticism of the work of Zhèng Xuán 鄭玄, “okay boomer”.
SGZ28.4 「諸君賴遭某,故得有今日耳。若遇吳漢之徒,已殄滅矣。」
Wú Hàn lead a division of the Hàn 漢 army against the rebel state of Chéng 成 state, founded by Gōngsūn Shù 公孫述. The city was purged and looted, the families of the generals and ministers all executed entirely. It was a wanton slaughter akin to Xiāngpíng’s 襄平 fate under Sīmǎ Yì 司馬懿.
He bribed his way out and escaped. Oops.
SGZ28.4「姜維自一時雄兒也,與某相值,故窮耳。」
Wèishì Chūnqiū: 艾仰天歎曰:「艾忠臣也,一至此乎!白起之酷,復見於今日矣。」
Bái Qǐ 白起 refused to commit his army to combat on the grounds that he knew the campaign was a failure, and when he remarked that “i told you so”, naturally the King of Qín 秦was furious and ordered him to commit his forces. Qǐ claimed illness and continued to refuse to serve in the war. The justly furious King of Qín stripped him of all rank and title, down ranking him to a commoner and exiled, yet again claimed he couldn't travel due to illness. Finally when he was "well enough" to travel, word reached the King that Bái Qǐ had been unsubmissive and complained greatly about the King, and so when he finally reached 10 li outside of the city Bái Qǐ received a sword, and thereupon realized why it was he deserved to die. Hundreds of thousands died at his hands at Changping after he tricked them all and buried them alive. In actuality Bái Qǐ by refusing the King’s orders time and time again was challenging his monarch directly. His death was as expected. Similar to our subject today there are those that believe he was unjustly killed.
The quarrel of Li Gao and Su Buwei perfectly emulates why this is bad. Ling Tong is a bad person. Lv Meng is a bad person. Xiahou Dun is a bad person. Honor Killings are despicable. Despite my dislike for the man in the question, I do not condone Ai’s death this way.
Hàn Jìn Chūnqiū: 初艾之下江由也,以續不進,欲斬,旣而捨之。及瓘遣續,謂曰:「可以報江由之辱矣。」
JS042.3 初,鄧艾之誅也,文帝以艾久在隴右,素得士心,一旦夷滅,恐邊情搔動,使彬密察之。彬還,白帝曰:「鄧艾忌克詭狹,矜能負才,順從者謂為見事,直言者謂之觸迕。雖長史司馬,參佐牙門,答對失指,輒見罵辱。處身無禮,大失人心。又好施行事役,數勞眾力。隴右甚患苦之,喜聞其禍,不肯為用。今諸軍已至,足以鎮壓內外,願無以為慮。」
SGZ28.4 泰始元年,晉室踐阼,詔曰:「昔太尉王淩謀廢齊王,而王竟不足以守位。征西將軍鄧艾,矜功失節,實應大辟。然被書之日,罷遣人衆,束手受罪,比於求生遂為惡者,誠復不同。今大赦得還,若無子孫者聽使立後,令祭祀不絕。」
JS048 段灼,字休然,敦煌人也。世為西土著姓,果直有才辯。少仕州郡,稍遷鄧艾鎮西司馬,從艾破蜀有功,封關內侯,累遷議郎。武帝即位,灼上疏追理艾曰:
故征西將軍鄧艾,心懷至忠,而荷反逆之名;平定巴、蜀,而受三族之誅,臣竊悼之。惜哉,言艾之反也!以艾性剛急,矜功伐善,而不能協同朋類,輕犯雅俗,失君子之心,故莫肯理之。臣敢昧死言艾所以不反之狀。
艾本屯田掌犢人,宣皇帝拔之于農吏之中,顯之於宰府之職。處內外之官,據文武之任,所在輒有名績,固足以明宣皇帝之知人矣。會值洮西之役,官兵失利,刺史王經困於圍城之中。當爾之時,二州危懼,隴右懍懍,幾非國家之有也。先帝以為深憂重慮,思惟可以安邊殺敵莫賢于艾,故授之以兵馬,解狄道之圍。圍解,留屯上邽。承官軍大敗之後,士卒破膽,將吏無氣,倉庫空虛,器械殫盡。艾欲積穀強兵,以待有事。是歲少雨,又為區種之法,手執耒耜,率先將士,所統萬數,而身不離僕虜之勞,親執士卒之役。故落門、段谷之戰,能以少擊多,摧破強賊,斬首萬計。遂委艾以廟勝成圖,指授長策。艾受命忘身,龍驤麟振,前無堅敵。蜀地阻險,山高穀深,而艾步乘不滿二萬,束馬懸車,自投死地,勇氣陵雲,將士乘勢,故能使劉禪震怖,君臣面縛。軍不逾時,而巴、蜀蕩定,此艾固足以彰先帝之善任矣。
艾功名已成,亦當書之竹帛,傳祚萬世。七十老公,復何所求哉!艾以禪初降,遠郡未附,矯令承制,權安社稷。雖違常科,有合古義,原心定罪,事可詳論。故鎮西將軍鐘會,有吞天下之心,恐艾威名,知必不同,因其疑似,構成其事。艾被詔書,即遣強兵,束身就縛,不敢顧望。誠自知奉見先帝,必無當死之理也。會受誅之後,艾參佐官屬、部曲將吏,愚戇相聚,自共追艾,破壞檻車,解其囚執。艾在困地,是以狼狽失據。夫反非小事,若懷噁心,即當謀及豪傑,然後乃能興動大眾,不聞艾有腹心一人。臨死口無惡言,獨受腹背之誅,豈不哀哉!故見之者垂涕,聞之者歎息。此賈誼所以慷慨于漢文,天下之事可為痛哭者,良有以也。
陛下龍興,闡弘大度,受誅之家,不拘敘用,聽艾立後,祭祀不絕。昔秦人憐白起之無罪,吳人傷子胥之冤酷,皆為之立祠。天下之人為艾悼心痛恨,亦由是也。謂可聽艾門生故吏收艾屍柩,歸葬舊墓,還其田宅,以平蜀之功,繼封其後,使艾闔棺定諡,死無所恨。赦冤魂于黃泉,收信義於後世,則天下徇名之士,思立功之臣,必投湯火,樂為陛下死矣!
SGZ28.4 忠而受誅,信而見疑,頭縣馬巿,諸子並斬,見之者垂泣,聞之者嘆息
Honestly, i think its funny when a regions geography makes people there willing to rebel. Shouchun is one such example, but Shu is another. Both Zhong Hui and Deng Ai wanted to rebel there and take over the state for their own, the grography of it is so enticing everyone eventually gets the idea to make it their own powerbase especially vis a vis a state limited to the north.
I really wanted for Three States Records to have translated Dèng Ài's bio, but luckily enough his Wiki article seems to be very well sourced, so I'll use that due to lacking another source.
I'll start by saying that suggesting that Liu Shan should remain in Shu-Han territory for a year was akin to hang a torch over a gunpowder barrel, with its lid open. Having Liu Shan there could easily lead to Shu-Han loyalists rising in revolt, using him as a figure to gather support around, so this was an incredibly dumb idea.
I'll also agree that Dèng Ài was overstepping his authority by appointing all those people (including appointing his subordinate, Shi Zuan as the Inspector of Yi Province), and that seems to have been a common feeling per what is written on his Wiki article. The fact it's stated he took a number of former Shu-Han as his subordinates also doesn't paint the best of pictures. He's also criticized as having become arrogant, letting his successes go over his head.
His plan for giving Wu a massive show of force is also way overblown in my opinion, as I don't see Wu surrendering just because of that (and indeed it would be another 16 years before that happened), so I can only imagine he was feeling way too overconfident of his own position and reputation. His insistence on bypassing the Emperor's authority for the sake of alacrity, which would give him great independent authority also didn't make for the best of looks.
Now, that being said, I'm not entirely sure if all these events lead to the certainty of Dèng Ài wishing to rebel... but they surely paint the picture of such a desire, and for a regime that had faced multiple attempted coups (254, 255 and 260) and rebellions (251, 255 and 257/58), I can't say I'm surprised that Sīmǎ Zhāo saw it as yet another frontier general preparing for rebellion, and acted accordingly.
I'll say that Dèng Ài, whether by rebellious intent or eager loyalty, dug his own grave and that's where he ended up resting in. So in that regard I think I have an opinion similar to yours.
PS: His Wiki article also states that Dèng Ài proposed his plan of taking the risky shortcut to Zhōng Huì, who approved of the plan, and even dethatched one of his subordinates to accompany him. And then there's the fact that Zhōng Huì was keeping in check the Shu-Han forces that could have blocked Dèng Ài's advance, also preventing them from reinforcing Zhuge Zhan, so giving full credit to him isn't something I'd do.